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In cases where a Greek-connected founder has placed shares in an operating business, investment assets or property within a foreign trust or foundation, the succession plan may appear complete because the beneficiaries have been identified and the economic destination of the wealth has been settled. Yet the founder may still occupy the centre of every significant decision, maintaining relationships with fiduciaries, resolving differences among family members and supplying the commercial judgement on which the structure depends.
The transfer of wealth does not, by itself, resolve the transfer of authority. Unless the governance arrangements can operate independently of the founder, the structure may preserve the assets while leaving the family uncertain about who is entitled to direct, supervise and interpret their future use.
Beneficial succession does not determine governance
The persons who will ultimately benefit from a structure are not necessarily the persons best placed to govern it. A beneficiary may have a legitimate economic interest without possessing the experience, independence or legal authority required to oversee a family business or long-term investment portfolio.
Liechtenstein structures reflect this separation. A foundation acts through its foundation council, while property transferred into a trust is administered by the trustee as independent legal owner for the beneficiaries. The governing bodies and fiduciaries therefore carry responsibilities that remain distinct from the beneficiaries’ economic position.
The documents should make that distinction intelligible to the family. Otherwise, later generations may assume that entitlement to benefit also carries a right to intervene in investment, distribution or appointment decisions.
Authority must pass through a defined mechanism
The founder may initially retain powers to appoint or remove officeholders, approve particular decisions or nominate members of an advisory body. Those rights require careful succession planning of their own.
If the founder dies or loses capacity, the structure should identify who succeeds to each power, how appointments will be made and whether any authority was intended to be personal and therefore to lapse. It should also address the possibility that several family members may claim an oversight role without sharing the same priorities.
The wider estate plan remains relevant. Regulation (EU) 650/2012 generally connects an international succession to the deceased’s habitual residence while permitting a choice of the law of nationality. Although the law governing the structure and the law governing the founder’s succession may differ, the two should be considered together so that authority does not pass under one arrangement while being contradicted or obscured by another.
Family participation requires disciplined limits
Later generations may reasonably expect a voice in structures intended to preserve family wealth. Participation, however, should not create several competing centres of control.
Family councils, advisory committees and protector-type roles may give beneficiaries a structured means of contributing to significant decisions without displacing the legal responsibilities of trustees or foundation bodies. Their powers should be defined with enough precision to prevent consultation from becoming informal veto and oversight from becoming operational control.
The governance test
Governance weaknesses often remain concealed while the founder is available to resolve ambiguity personally. They become visible only after death or incapacity, when fiduciaries and family members must determine which practices reflected binding authority and which depended on deference to the founder.
A durable structure translates the founder’s judgement into institutions, powers and procedures that remain capable of operating after personal influence has ended. Its success is therefore measured not only by where the wealth passes, but by whether authority passes with equal clarity.